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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2004, the stock market was abuzz over the upcoming Google,
Inc. initial public offering of its common stock. The secretive company from
Silicon Valley built an impressive and popular search engine and recruited some of
the area's top talent to its campus in Mountain View, California.1 It further drove
investor interest by its unorthodox approach to corporate communication 2 and by
shunning the established investment banks to conduct an innovative Dutch auction
style of offering.' However, just days before the offering was to commence, the
financial press announced that it would likely need to be delayed.4 Did the company
announce poor financial results? Embroil itself in an accounting scandal? No, Larry
Page and Sergey Brin, Google's young founders, gave an interview to Playboy
magazine.5 The concern was that the interview violated a Securities and Exchange
Commission-imposed (SEC) quiet period between the time that the company filed
its offering documents and the time when the offering was to commence.6 Google
later amended its SEC filings to specifically address the Playboy interview, and the
offering was allowed to proceed. This Article addresses the following questions:

1. See, e.g., Paul R. La Monica, Google Sets $2.7 Billion IPO, CNN MONEY, April 30, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/04/29/technology/google/ (discussing Google's operations and predicting
the effects on its public offering).
2. Google included an "Owner's Manual" in its prospectus that included the exhortation "Don't
be Evil." Letters from the Founders, An "Owner's Manual"forGoogle ' Shareholders.in Google Inc.
Prospectus, Amendment No. 7 to Form S-1 Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933,
SEC File No. 333-114984, filed August 13, 2004, at 32 [hereinafter Google Inc. Prospectus], available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 1288776/000119312504139655/ds Ia.htm.
3. See Google Inc. Prospectus. supra note 2. For an accessible explanation of the Dutch auction
IPO process. see Bruce Gottlieb. What Is a Dutch Auction IPO?. SLATE. May 6, 1999,
http://www.slate.com/id/ 1002736/.
4. See Keith Regan, Glitches Might Delay Google IPO, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004,
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/35663.html.
5. Updated: Playboy Interview Clouds Google 1PO. MARKETINGVOX, Aug. 13, 2004,
http://www.marketingvox.com/archives/2004/08/13/updated~playboyinterview cloudsgoogleipo.
6. Id. For an extended discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 184-86 and accompanying
text.
7. In order to proceed with the offering, Google included additional disclosures in its prospectus,
including the following:
Information about Google has been published in an article appearing in the
September 2004 issue of Playboy Magazine and entitled "Playboy Interview:
Google Guys." The text of the article, which is included in this prospectus as
Appendix B, contains information derived from an interview of Larry and Sergey
conducted in April 2004, prior to the filing of our registration statement of which
this prospectus is a part. The article presented certain statements about our
company in isolation and did not disclose many of the related risks and
uncertainties described in this prospectus. As a result, the article should not be
considered in isolation and you should make your investment decision only after
reading this entire prospectus carefully.
You should carefully evaluate all the information in this prospectus.
including the risks described in this section and throughout the prospectus. We
have in the past received, and may continue to receive, a high degree of media
coverage, including coverage that is not directly attributable to statements made
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How did the SEC get the power to decide if people can give magazine interviews,
and is that a power that the SEC should have?
The idea that investors should be allowed to make their own decisions
regarding the purchase and sale of securities is at the core of the federal system of
securities regulation.8 This freedom depends on issuers of securities informing
prospective investors of all material information about both the securities and the
company issuing them. 9 In other words, disclosure eliminates the need for
substantive regulation. Corporate disclosure is no more than what nonlawyers call
speech,1 ° and the protection of speech is at the heart of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.1" However, no less of an authority than the United
States Supreme Court has declared that the regulation of securities does not fall
within the protection of the First Amendment. 12 This lack of recognition comes
from the traditional principle that commercial speech is less worthy of protection
than other forms of expression, 3 and that the regulation of the purchase and sale of
securities is a commercial activity that does not even deserve the limited protection
afforded to commercial speech.' 4
Two patterns have emerged over the last thirty years that warrant a
reconsideration of this approach. First, the Supreme Court has significantly
broadened the protections afforded to commercial speech. 5 This increased
protection reflects a concern for the dissemination of truthful information and a
willingness to protect First Amendment values, even when another regulatory
regime is present. Second, economic research and related legal scholarship suggest
that there is less need for the SEC to protect investors than exists in the case of
normal consumer protection, where advertising enjoys full status as commercial

by our officers and employees. You should rely only on the information contained
in this prospectus in making your investment decision.
We do not believe that our involvement in the Playboy Magazine article
constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. However, if our
involvement were held by a court to be in violation of the Securities Act of 1933,
we could be required to repurchase the shares sold to purchasers in this offering
at the original purchase price for a period of one year following the date of the
violation.
Google, Inc. Prospectus, supra note 2, at 21 22. The Playboy Magazine interview is reprinted in
Appendix B to the prospectus. Id. app. B.
8. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the Economic Casefor a Mandatory Disclosure
System. 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 670 (1984).
9. For a description of the federal securities laws, see infra Part TEA.
10. Roberta S. Karmel, Introduction, The FirstAmendment and Government Regulation of
Economic Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1. 1 (1989). Citations to 55 Brooklyn Law Review refer to page
numbers as indicated on original printed pages.
1I. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See, e.g.. Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49. 61 (1973). For a more detailed
discussion, see infra Part ILA.
13. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002).
14. SEC v. Wall Street Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
15. See infra Part 1.B.
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speech.16 This Article argues that, upon the convergence of these two trends, the
Court should apply its newly-robust commercial speech protection to regulations
issued by the SEC. If given such protection, certain parts of these regulations would
be struck down as unconstitutional infringements on the First Amendment rights
of corporations, and newly proposed regulations
would be more carefully analyzed
17
for their impact on corporate speech rights.
The Supreme Court has alternately defined commercial speech as "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience,"18 or as
speech that proposes a commercial transaction. 9 The Court has singled out this
form of expression and afforded it a lower level of protection under the First
Amendment. The degree of protection, however, has grown over time. For many
years, the Court refused to protect commercial speech at all,2 ° if ever so slightly. In
1976, the Court finally acknowledged that commercial speech fell under the First
Amendment.2 In the 1980 case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, the Court set out a four-part test for commercial speech that
determines whether government should be allowed to regulate this speech, even if
it is protected in some manner.22 For more than twenty-five years, the Court
has
23
been exploring the limits of this protection as defined by the four-part test.
There is a broad range of communications that corporations and other
participants in the capital markets make at the behest of the SEC. For example,
corporations periodically report on their financial condition and the results of
operations, 24 submit proxy solicitations, 25 report unusual events,26 discuss the
27
professional history and ownership interests of management and board members,
and describe prospective offerings of securities.2 ' Each of these communications is
made with the purpose of informing the potential investment decisions of members
of the public.

16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 64 (1977);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council. Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
19. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) (quoting Va. State
Bd of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 762).
20. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
21. See Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy. 425 U.S. at 770.
22. 447 U.S. at 566.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations;
Certain Investment Company Disclosures. Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No.
26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16.961. 54 Fed. Reg. 22.427. at 22,427 (May 24. 1989)
(citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1989)).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
26. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date. Securities Act
Release No. 8400, Exchange Act Release No. 49,424, 69 Fed. Reg. 15.594, at 15.596 (Mar. 25. 2004).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I)(A) (2000).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2006) (explaining the conditions a
notice of a proposed offering must meet so that it will not, itself, be considered an offer).
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These communications are mandated by the SEC,29 but no court has indicated
that they should be considered commercial speech. The case law relating to
commercial speech is confined to product or service advertising, but the Supreme
Court has recently expressed an interest in considering the expansion of the
doctrine beyond pure product advertising. ° Securities regulation is a natural
candidate for the extension of the commercial speech doctrine. The SEC's
mandatory disclosures made by issuers relate directly to the purchase and sale of
securities. The SEC actively seeks both to require and prohibit certain types of
speech, and the legal and finance literature support the contention that market
participants will continue to seek out this type of information. 31 Furthermore, the
Court has not shown reluctance in involving itself in speech regulations that are the
product of an otherwise comprehensive regulatory structure.
If this speech is commercial speech, the regulations calling for corporations to
speak in this manner must meet the requirements of the CentralHudson test, as it
has been interpreted for more than twenty-five years, in order for them to be
constitutional. The four parts of the test are as follows: the communication must not
be false or misleading, the regulation must relate to a substantial government
interest, the regulation must directly advance the state interest involved, and the
government interest must not be able to be served as well by a more limited
31
restriction.
Examination of specific SEC regulations calls into question the ability of some
regulations to pass the Central Hudson test, particularly the final two elements.33
Most in danger of invalidation are those regulations that prohibit truthful speech.
The SEC has broadly interpreted its mandate to ensure market integrity, particularly
in the area of preventing the distribution of false or misleading information. It has
issued regulations that contain prophylactic prohibitions on certain types of speech
based on the fear that the increased mix of data will mislead investors. It is just this
type of paternalism that recent commercial speech cases reject.
Also, in the last few years, the SEC has put forth a staggering number of new
regulations. 34 Each proposed regulation goes through an elaborate process of

29. Actually, a corporation is only subject to periodic reporting requirements if it meets certain
threshold levels of asset value and number of shareholders. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a). (g) (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004).
30. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (2002), cert. granted,537 U.S. 1098, 1099 110 (2003),
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 654. 657 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that Nike's public statements defending
labor practices were commercial speech that would be regulated to prevent consumer protection). The
fact that the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari shows it has some interest in the area.
31. See, e.g., Burt Neubome, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital
Markets, 55 BROOK L. REv. 5. 28-30 (1989) (arguing that "hearers" have a strong interest in receiving
information that improves their ability to make informed choices).
32. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
33. See infra Part IV.
34. Most of these regulations have been in connection with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11. 15, 18. 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp.
2004)). This Act and the related SEC rules have introduced many new and often burdensome
regulations to issuers. For a recent analysis questioning the value ofthis law, see Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-OxleyAct and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance. 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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proposal, comment, and modification, adoption or rejection. 5 However, nowhere
in this process is the constitutionally protected right to speech considered, much
less protected. By bringing First Amendment considerations into focus, it is likely
that the SEC will be able to take these concerns into account before forcing
significant compliance costs on issuers.
The idea that corporate speech should be protected under the First Amendment
is not new. Others have commented on this matter before, and with great insight
and passion.36 However, circumstances were not right at that point in time to
impose meaningful change. The commercial speech doctrine remained limited by
a now-abandoned precedent that significantly reduced the doctrine's practical
application. 7 Some commentators were not interested in applying current law but
rather were arguing for full or higher protection of speech, placing commercial
speech on the same plane as political or religious expression. 38 The aim of this
Article is narrower and more attainable. It argues that, with the maturation of the
commercial speech doctrine, a logical extension of current precedent should allow
for scrutiny of securities regulation on the same terms as other commercial speech.
Specifically, this Article contends that doctrinal developments in First
Amendment law, when combined with insights provided by modern finance theory

35. Congress and the SEC have prescribed the process for adoption of new SEC regulations not
explicitly authorized by statute at 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000 & Supp. III 2003), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004).
36. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, CorporateGovernance Speech and the First
Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV.163. 163 (1994) (discussing the appropriate levels of First Amendment
protection for corporate governance speech and suggesting that at least one category of corporate
communication-proxy solicitation-should be treated as political speech): Aleta G. Estreicher,
Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 225 (1990) (characterizing
commercial speech as contributing to the social commitment to decisionmaking and arguing for
protection of some securities-related expression); Neubome, supra note 3 1, at 62 (concluding that SEC
regulations are vulnerable to First Amendment attack, but that a substantial increase in court challenges
is unlikely); Nicholas Wolfson, The FirstAmendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 265-66
(1988) (examining the impact of the First Amendment on the principal areas of SEC regulation).
37. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986). For a full
discussion of Posadas.see infra Part l.B.
38. See, e.g.. Estreicher, supranote 36. at 225 ("To view commercial speech as some second-class
species of expression is to ignore the contribution such speech makes to the societal commitment to
decentralized decisionmaking."); Alan Howard, The ConstitutionalityofDeceptive Speech Regulations:
Replacing the CommercialSpeech Doctrinewith a Tort-BasedRelationalFramework,41 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1093. 1095 (1991) (contending that "many more deceptive speech regulations should and will
be subjected to First Amendment challenge and review"); Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional
Conception of the Corporation,4 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 95, 96 (1995) (explaining that under the
"corporate person" theory. corporate speech is produced by artificial legal entities, and therefore should
not be accorded the same First Amendment protection as speech by individuals, but that under the
"contract" theory, the corporate faade disappears and the rights should be accorded to the individual
speakers); Wolfson, supra note 36, at 266 77 (arguing that the underlying reasons for protecting
political speech also exist with respect to commercial speech). But see Michael P. Dooley, The First
Amendment and the SEC: A Comment, 20 CONN. L. REV. 335. 337 (1988) ( "[T]he task that Wolfson
has undertaken is to convince us that traditional corporate disclosure is either speech necessary to the
process of representative self-government, or, somewhat more controversially, speech necessary to
individual self-fulfillment").
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and historical SEC practice, argue in favor of extending First Amendment
protection to corporate speech made in the form of SEC disclosures. Part 11 of the
Article describes the structure of the SEC's mandatory disclosure system, the
current state of the case law removing it from scrutiny under the First Amendment,
and the development of the commercial speech doctrine. Next, Part 1II pursues the
idea of protecting SEC disclosures as commercial speech, based on its similarity to
those forms of speech currently covered by the doctrine. Finally, Part IV analyzes
SEC regulations under commercial speech principles and concludes that those
prohibiting the dissemination of truthful information would be struck down.
However, the Article finds the vast majority of federal securities regulations-rules
that either require disclosure or place conditions on the manner of
disclosure consistent with the First Amendment.
II.

AN

OVERVIEW

OF

THE

MANDATORY

DISCLOSURE

REGIME

AND THE

COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

This part introduces the primary statutes and rules setting up the mandatory
disclosure system, discusses the goals of the legislation, and assesses the Supreme
Court's holdings on the constitutional status of the statutes and rules. Then, it
describes the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, from the refusal to
consider commercial speech as protected under the First Amendment, to the
announcement of the doctrine and its test, to the progression of the jurisprudence
since the basic test was announced in Central Hudson.
A.

The MandatoryDisclosure System

Congress enacted the two principal federal securities laws, in 193339 and
1934,4o during the Great Depression. Enactment of these laws were reactions to the
speculation in capital markets prior to the market crash in 1929. 4' The regulatory
mechanism that Congress chose was to require companies wishing to issue
securities to the public to make known certain facts about the issuer and the
offering before offers or sales could be made.42 This approach contrasted with the
substantive regulation of offerings, where the government could prohibit offerings
that were too risky, or prohibit purchasers from participating in offerings that were
unsuitable. Congress created the SEC to oversee and regulate the capital markets
and the securities industry. 3

39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000 & Supp. 1V 2004).
40. See id. §§ 78a-78mm.
41. See Joel Seligman, The HistoricalNeedfor a MandatoryCorporate DisclosureSystem, 9 J.
CORP. L. 1, 18 33 (1983).
42. See Allen D. Boyer, Free Speech, Free Markets, andFoolishConsistency. 92 COLUM. L. REV.
474, 488 (1992) (book review) (asserting the three primary aspects of the regulatory scheme as "full
disclosure, assured by diligent investigation, on pain of strict liability").
43. For a thorough, but somewhat dated, description of the SEC's regulatory activity, see U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE WORK OF THE SEC (1988).
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The second of the two major securities laws chronologically, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 4 4 serves as the primary foundation of today's
disclosure regime. It requires a company that is registered on a national securities
exchange or that attains a certain threshold of total shareholders and assets to
periodically report certain information about itself.45 Every year, a reporting
company must provide a comprehensive report on its operations. 4' This disclosure
must be updated each quarter.47 In the interim, the occurrence of important,
specified events requires an additional notice to the SEC.48 The '34 Act also
requires other extensive disclosures, including those relating to proxy
5
50
communications, 49 beneficial ownership reporting, and tender offer filings. 1
Finally, the '34 Act provides for liability, most notably in Section 10b 52 and via
Rule lOb-5. 53
The previous year, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act).54 One
of the primary functions of the '33 Act is to dictate how issuers get themselves into
the '34 Act disclosure regime.55 Its primary requirement in this regard is to mandate
registration of all offerings and sales of securities unless the Act contains a
particular exemption from the registration requirement. 56 The '33 Act provides
exemptions for both transactions5 7 and securities. 5 8 Also, the '33 Act provides for
civil 59 and criminal liability,60 particularly for misstatements in a prospectus.
There are other, less well known acts that are part of the federal securities laws.
The Trust Indenture Act of 193961 regulates debt securities, and the Investment
Company Act of 194062 and Investment Advisors Act of 194063 regulate aspects of
the securities industry. Congress recently repealed the Public Utility Holding

44. 15 U.S.C. 78a 78mm (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (g).
46. Form 10-K, for Annual and Transition Reports Pursuant to Sections 13 of 15(d) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2006).
47. Form 10-Q. for Quarterly and Transition Reports under Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 249.308a (2006).
48. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration Filing, supra note 26.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
50. Id. § 78p.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2000).
52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, § 10b, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000)).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
54. 15 U.S.C. 77a-77aa (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
55. Of course, the '34 Act contains provisions that require some companies to make disclosures
even though they haven't completed a public offering under the '33 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2000
& Supp. 1V 2004).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)(2000).
57. Id. § 77d.

58. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
Id. § 771(a)(2).
15 U.S.C. 77aaa 77bbbb (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
Pub. L. No. 768,54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 80a- I to 80a-52 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
54 Stat. 847 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
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Company Act of 1935, but for seventy years it regulated the internal affairs of
public utilities throughout the United States.64 This Article focuses on the core
provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts, but principles relating to these Acts should
apply to the other securities laws as well.
The intent of these laws is to promote efficiency, fairness, and the integrity of
capital markets. s These goals have been reiterated over the years and remain a
central focus of the SEC today.66 In interpreting these laws, the Court has never
squarely addressed the question of an issuer's First Amendment rights relating to
SEC disclosure requirements.6 Nevertheless, there has been a strong presumption
in other First Amendment cases that securities regulation was not subject to
constitutional protections available for free speech. Before the adoption of the
commercial speech doctrine, the Court noted approvingly in ParisAdult Theatre
I v. Slaton68 that "both Congress and state legislatures have ... strictly regulated
public expression by issuers of and dealers in securities.., commanding what they
must and must not publish and announce. 69 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n,7 °
the Court more clearly expressed the presumption that SEC disclosures were
beyond the scope of First Amendment protection: "Numerous examples could be
cited of communications that are regulated without offending
the First Amendment,
'71
such as the exchange of information about securities.
B.

The Commercial Speech Doctrine
1. Initial Recognition of CommercialSpeech Protection

Until 1976, no form of commercial speech received any sort of First
Amendment protection. The Court provided justification for this dismissive
treatment in Valentine v. Chrestensen.72 In Valentine, a New York businessman

64. 15 U.S.C. § 79 to 79z-6 (2000). repealedby Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005.
Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1263, 119 Stat. 972, 974.
65. Although, some scholars have quibbled with the exact characterization. See, e.g., Edmund W.
Kitch. The Theory andPracticeofSecurities Disclosure,61 BROOK. L. REV. 763,764 (1995) (claiming
accuracy. rather than efficiency, as a primary goal of securities regulations).
66. After the failure of disclosure to alert markets to the fraud at Enron, some commentators began
to question the ability of disclosure rules to reach these goals. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6 7 (2004) (arguing for
supplemental protections to the disclosure mandates).
67. See Larry D. Soderquist, CorporateFirstAmendment Rights andthe SEC, 41 EMoRYL.J. 159,
166 (1992) (book review) (citing early constitutional challenges to the securities laws based on the
commerce clause).
68. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
69. Jd. at 61-62.
70. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
71. Id. at 456 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968)). For an
extended discussion of areas that are outside of the scope of First Amendment protection, see Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
72. 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
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wanted to distribute a leaflet advertising an exhibition of a former navy submarine
that he owned but was enjoined by the New York police for violating the city
ordinance relating to the distribution of handbills. 73 He appealed the injunction on
First Amendment grounds. 74 The Court held that, although a municipality "may not
unduly burden or proscribe" the "exercise of the freedom of communicating
information and disseminating opinion," the "Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. 7 5 For several
decades, the Court read this decision to exclude commercial speech from the
protection of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed its stance in VirginiaState Board of Pharmacyv.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.76 In this case, a group of citizens sued to
challenge a state statute that forbade pharmacists from advertising the prices of
prescription drugs. The Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional
restriction on protected speech. 78 The Court noted that First Amendment protection
is granted not just to the speaker, but to the communication itself, thus protecting
both speaker and listener. 9 It then outlined why commercial speech fell within the
First Amendment. First, purely economic motives do not disqualify speech.8" Next,
consumers have a strong "interest in the free flow of commercial information.""8'
Finally, the public interest is served by the efficient allocation of resources,
accomplished through the free flow of commercial information." While
recognizing that it is permissible to regulate commercial speech, the Court
concluded that the state could not "completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that
information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients."83 Over the last thirty
years, the Court has tried to determine exactly what types of suppression do fit
under the First Amendment.
2. Developing a Testfor PermissibleRegulations
The Court first set forth its test for determining whether government regulation
of commercial speech is permissible in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.84 In CentralHudson, the Public Service Commission

73. Id. at 53.
74. See id. at 54.
75. Id. at 54.
76. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
77. Id. at 749 50 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 770.
79. Id. at 756. For an argument that the First Amendment analysis should broadly consider other
parties' interests, see Neuborne, supra note 31, at 28 30 (describing a "hearer centered" conception of
free speech protection, in contrast to the speaker centered analysis that dominates today).
80. Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy. 425 U.S. at 762.
81. Id. at 763.
82. Id. at 765.
83. Id. at 773.
84. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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of the state of New York banned all promotional advertising by electric utilities.85
Central Hudson challenged this restriction, citing the right to free speech
recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.86 The Court determined that the
state's ban was broader than what measures could be permitted consistent with the
protections of the First Amendment.1
The Court applied a four-part test in reaching its conclusion.88 First, the
communication must not be false or misleading.89 Next, the regulation must relate
to a substantial government interest.9" Third, the regulation must directly advance
the state interest involved.9 Lastly, the government interest must not be able to be
served as well by a more limited restriction.92 Since the creation of this test,
subsequent cases have dealt mostly with interpretation of the third and fourth
prongs what it means to directly advance the governmental interest and how to
determine the adequacy of amore limited restriction. In fact, CentralHudson itself
turned on the Court's determination that the ban on advertising was broader than
necessary to accomplish its objectives.93 This finding set the tone that a certain
degree of scrutiny would be applied to the determination of means and ends. 4
3.

Willingness to Address Regulated Fields

One objection commentators raise to the Court's imposition of First
Amendment principles to commercial speech generally, and to securities regulation
particularly, is that other regulatory structures are already in place. Three cases
decided around the time of Central Hudson confirmed the Court's willingness to
review speech restrictions, even in heavily regulated areas. Ohralik v Ohio State
Bar Ass 'n95 and In re R.M.J.96 both dealt with speech restrictions on attorney
advertising under state bar rules. Comprehensive regulation of attorneys has long

85. Id.at 558 59.
86. See id. at 560.
87. Id.at 570.
88. Id.at 566.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 570.
94. Later Supreme Court decisions elaborated on exactly what level of scrutiny ought to be
applied to each prong of the test. The idea that the regulation at issue must directly advance the state
interest was visited in a number of cases. For example, in Rubin v.Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,
478 (1995), the Court examined a federal law prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol content.
It held that this law did not directly further the interest in protecting public health by minimizing
competition based on alcohol content. Id.at 488. The Court pointed to other provisions in the act that
might allow advertising based on strength provisions that allow high content beer to call itself"malt
liquor." and that require wine and spirits to include on its labels the exact information that it forbids beer
from including. Id. at 488-89. For a general discussion of this matter, see Butler & Ribstein. supra note
36, at 169.
95. 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978).
96. 455 U.S. 191, 193 (1982).
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been considered a matter of state concern.9 7 In R.M.J., the Court addressed an
objection to the regulation of attorney advertising that was only potentially
misleading and upheld the regulation.98 In Ohralik, the Court allowed Ohio to
regulate face-to-face solicitations of potential clients, even though the solicitation
was speech, because the speech was intended to further a business transaction over
which the state had regulatory authority."9 Even though the Court upheld these
regulations, it signaled an early interest in review of speech, even if that speech is
otherwise subject to regulatory scrutiny.
This interest in regulated areas continued in Zaudererv. Office ofDisciplinary
Counsel,' which involved an Ohio rule that required attorneys to make certain
disclosures in advertisements about contingency fee rates. 1 1 The Court upheld the
requirement but distinguished this mandatory disclosure requirement from a
regulation that restricts the flow of information.0 2 Because it distinguished between
prohibitions on speech and additional disclosure requirements, Zauderer was an
important step in the Court's annunciation of a robust commercial speech doctrine
including, maybe especially, areas that are of regulatory interest to other arms of
government.
A recent case illustrates that the Court still embraces serious scrutiny of heavily
regulated fields. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,'°3 the Court upheld
a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act.0 4
Specifically, it found that the proposed ban on advertising and promoting
compound drugs was broader than necessary under the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test.'0 5 The Court made this ruling in light of the broad authority of the
Food and Drug Administration over the process of developing, producing, and
disseminating drugs.0 6
4. Narrow Focus-The Vice Exception
After announcing the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacyand setting out the test in CentralHudson,the Court significantly limited
the doctrine for the first time in Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico.' ° Posadas dealt with a proposed ban on advertising for casino
gambling in Puerto Rico.'0 8 The Court upheld this prohibition on the theory that the
state's power to entirely prohibit gambling implied the lesser power to restrict

97. See Fla. Barv. Went For It, Inc.. 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995).
98. R.f.J., 455 U.S. at 203, 207.
99. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 459.
100. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
101. Id. at 633.
102. Id. at 650 51.
103. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
104. Id.at 360.
105. Id.at 373.
106. See id. at 361 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000)).
107. 478 U.S. 328, 340-46 (1986).
108. Id.at330.
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speech advertising the activity. °9 Commentators believed that the case signaled a
"vice" exception to the protections on commercial speech, so that if a legislature
could prohibit or otherwise limit an activity, it could also take the lesser step of
prohibiting advertising about it."10
This vice exception had the potential to swallow the newly-created commercial
speech doctrine. If Congress or a state or local government can prohibit speech as
part of an attempt to eliminate or curtail certain types of behavior, then it has liberty
to stop or hinder many types of expression. Many forms of commercial expression,
from advertising of alcohol and cigarettes, to unhealthy fast food, to firearms, could
be limited or prohibited if speech were allowed to be regulated as part of a larger
regulatory scheme to impact behavior.
The Court seemed to extend this type of analysis in United States v. Edge
BroadcastingCo. "' In Edge BroadcastingCo., the Court upheld a ban on lottery
ads in nonlottery states, finding that the ban directly advanced the policies of both
lottery and nonlottery states." 2 This holding can only bejustified under the Posadas
reasoning; the ability to ban a lottery in one jurisdiction should include the lesser
power to ban advertising relating to a lottery conducted elsewhere.' 13
5. Renewed Vigor-44 Liquormart to Lorillard
The idea of a vice exception ended in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island."14
In this case, the challenge was to laws prohibiting the advertisement of alcohol
pricing." 5 The Court not only struck down the restrictions as inconsistent with the
First Amendment, but it went far beyond that. 116 First, Justice Stevens explicitly
rejected the vice exception that was recognized in Posadas."7 The Court then
expressed its reluctance to condone government suppression of truthful speech,
stating that it should be "especially skeptical of regulations that seek to 1keep
people
18
in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."

109. Id. at 345-46.
110. See Developments in the Law: CorporationsandSociety, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2280-81
(2004).
111. 509 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1993).
112. Id.at 430 31.
113. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 345 55.
114. 517 U.S. 484, 510 (Stevens, J., plurality) (1996): see also Developments in the
Law Corporationsand Society. supra note 110, at 2281 (stating that the "vice principle' remained
an important holdout in the Court's broadening protections for commercial speech. But the principle
gave way in 44 Liquormart,when the Court overturned a statute forbidding the publication of liquor
prices, rejecting earlier precedent and refusing to grant the 'broad discretion to suppress truthful.
nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes.' (quoting 44 Liquormart,Inc.. 517 U.S. at 510)).
115. 44 Liquormart, Inc.,
517 U.S. at 489.
116. See id.at 486 87; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free
Speech: The Implications of44 Liquormart. 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 123, 126 27 (claiming that the decision
called into question the reasons for treating commercial speech as a less protected category. distinct
from fully protected speech).
117. Id.at 513 14 (Stevens, J., plurality).
118. Id. at 502-04 (Stevens, J.. plurality).
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The reasoning of 44 Liquormart is important because it recognized the
significance of truthful speech in First Amendment doctrine and the limited times
when it is appropriate for the government to restrict the flow of truthful information
for paternalistic reasons. Justice O'Connor also proposed narrow criteria indicating
when the Court would consider these types of restrictions reasonable: the regulator
has conducted a "careful calcula[tion of] the costs and benefits associated with the
burden on speech,""' 9 there are no "less burdensome alternatives"
available, 2 ° and
121
exist.
material
same
the
alternative methods of communicating
The Court extended and solidified this emphasis in LorillardTobacco Co. v.
Reilly. 122 Lorillardinvolved the validity of restrictions on tobacco advertising in
Massachusetts. 123 Concerns relating to tobacco usage are a particular and welldocumented matter of interest to the government, both in healthcare spending and
the protection of minors. 124 However, the Court struck down point of sale tobacco
advertising restrictions as contrary to the First Amendment. 21 One lesson from the
Court's holding is that the Court is willing to protect speech rights no matter the
strength of the regulatory objectives otherwise involved.
6. Ready to Step Beyond ProductAdvertising?
In its October 2003 term, the Court seemed to be willing to address how and
to what extent the commercial speech doctrine applied to corporate speech beyond
the simple product advertisement. Nike, Inc. conducted a public relations campaign
in response to accusations that its labor practices in certain Asian countries were
unfair. 126 In Kasky v. Nike, a California citizen sued Nike under the state's Unfair
Competition Law and False Advertising Law. 127 Nike responded to the suit,
claiming protections under the First Amendment; however, the California Supreme
Court rejected the claim. 128 The U.S. Supreme Court originally agreed to hear this
case to determine if these advertisements should be treated as commercial speech,
even though they did not directly propose transactions, 29 or given heightened
scrutiny, as Nike hoped, because it considered the advertisements to address matters
of public concern, or given lower scrutiny, as Kasky hoped, because the speech was
allegedly false and misleading. 130 Unfortunately for Nike and the development of

119. Id.at 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410. 417 (1993)).
120. Id.
121. Id.at 529 30.
122. 533 U.S. 525, 561 66 (2001).
123. Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
124. See id. at 564-65.
125. Id.at 566 67.
126. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243,248 (Cal. 2002), cert.granted,537 U.S. 1099 (2003), cert.
dismissed, 539 U.S. 654. 655 (2003) (per curiam).
127. Id. at 248-50.
128. Id.at 262.
129. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099, 1099 100 (2003) (granting certiorari).
130. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
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the commercial speech doctrine, the Court dismissed the case on the grounds that
the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted; the Court allowed the California
Supreme Court decision to stand. 3 ' Even though the Court did not use Kasky to
extend or clarify the reach of the commercial speech doctrine, the matter is
apparently on the Justices' minds.
111. SEC

DISCLOSURE IS COMMERCIAL SPEECH

If the Court is looking for an area in which to apply the commercial speech
doctrine beyond mere product advertising, the mandatory securities disclosure by
issuers under the '33 and '34 Acts would be an ideal candidate. This part argues
that SEC disclosures made by issuers should be considered commercial speech, and
these rules and regulations should be scrutinized under the prevailing commercial
speech standards. This treatment is appropriate for SEC disclosures because they
relate to proposing or effecting a transaction, hearers of this speech are less in need
of protection than consumers of ordinary products, and the disclosures do not meet
criteria for heightened First Amendment protection.
A.

SEC DisclosuresPropose a Transaction

Although the Court has not presented a clear definition of commercial speech,
it has referred to commercial speech as speech proposing a commercial
133
transaction 132 or speech relating to the economic interests of the participants.
These descriptions fit neatly with the core purpose of the capital markets.
When stripped to its essence, all securities disclosure required of issuers
involves something very similar to a tightly regulated advertisement for that
issuer's securities. The '33 Act regulates these advertising materials most
directly. 34 If a company wants to issue securities, it must prepare the appropriate
disclosure documents, file them with the SEC, and use those documents, and only
the information contained in those documents, to offer the securities for sale. 131 Just
as in normal product advertising, the seller (the issuing corporation) informs the
public about its product (securities) in the hopes that members of the public will
decide to make a purchase. The SEC participates in this process by ensuring
that
136
the information given to potential investors is complete and accurate.

131. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 539 U.S. 654. 657 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari).
132. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 74 (1989) (quoting Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
133. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (citing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979)); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 64 (1977);
Va. State Bd of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 762).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2000).
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77h (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, The Law
of Securities Regulation, § 2.2 (rev. 5th ed. 2006) (providing an overview of section 2.2 ofthe '33 Act).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2000) (providing the SEC's authority to review and regulate all
registrations).
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The periodic disclosure requirements of the '34 Act serve a similar purpose,
although in a more indirect manner. In order to provide prospective purchasers and
sellers with adequate information on which to base their investment decisions, the
SEC requires the annual, quarterly, and interim filings under the '34 Act.137 Courts
have acknowledged that investors use these disclosures to make investment
decisions. 138 Although the issuer is not the seller in most transactions that occur
based on '34 Act disclosure, the issuer is aware that purchases and sales are being
made in reliance on its disclosures. 139 In addition, because issuers periodically
return to the securities markets, the price set by transactions in the secondary
market impacts the company itself.
It is true that the SEC could have taken a more intrusive approach by limiting
the actual offerings or prohibiting certain types of purchasers, such as those less
sophisticated, from participating in offerings. The restriction of speech allows
prospective issuers more regulatory flexibility than they would otherwise have, not
less. However, the rejection of the Posadascase in 44 Liquormartdoes not provide
the ability to censor speech simply because the speech relates to activities that the
government can prohibit. 4 Therefore, the fact that the SEC could act more
drastically under its power to regulate commercial activity should not exempt the
SEC's speech regulations from scrutiny under the commercial speech doctrine.
Some commentators have argued that securities are different from other
consumer goods. 14 1 While it is true that a prospective purchaser cannot inspect or
consume a security to determine its contents and worth as he would a tangible
product, securities are not terribly different from many types of products subject to
more traditional advertising that is checked by the First Amendment.
Pharmaceutical products, such as the compounded drugs involved in Thompson v.
Western States Medical Center, require disclosure to determine their contents. The
reliance of the public on disclosures in each of these instances is similar. A share
of stock in General Electric or Microsoft does not entitle the holder to the same
economic benefits as a share of stock in Enron, and prospective purchasers sort out
the distinctions based on disclosures provided initially by the companies. Similarly,
a pill for hay fever and a pill for erectile dysfunction may look the same, but their
effects on the body are quite different. A patient must trust the disclosure of the
drug company to determine which is which.

137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. 2004) (describing the reports required by issuers of
securities).
138. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,245 (1988) (recognizing that traders in shares
of Basic Inc. "had done so in reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market").
139. Also, with the adoption of the integrated disclosure system, issuers often use '34 Actperiodic
reports as part of the '33 Act filings. In those instances, the text of the '34 Act reports will become part
of the prospectus used to market those securities sold directly by the issuer.
140. See supra Part 11.B.4-5.
141. See, e.g., Arthur Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a GreaterRole for the
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 82 88 (1989) (arguing that the difference between securities
markets and other markets should allow the SEC "greater deference in its regulation of disclosure").
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B. Investors Need Less Government Protection Than Others
142
Both the SEC and the Court are concerned about the hearers of information.
The mandatory disclosure regime is in place to protect investors and promote
efficiency in markets.143 These goals are achieved by getting information to
prospective investors in a time and manner that will allow them to make investment
decisions, and by prohibiting false or misleading information that would cloud
those decisions. The Court is concerned with the dissemination of truthful
information and intervenes when government interferes with the consensual sharing
of truthful information relating to a product or service.' 44
At first blush, the concerns of the SEC seem similar to those of the FDA in
determining appropriate advertising of new drugs, or those of a state bar association
when regulating attorney solicitations. Each body wants to protect its
constituency-investors, drug consumers, potential legal clients-from fraud or
deception. However, with regard to mandatory disclosures, there is less need for the
SEC to be concerned for investors than there is for a consumer protection group to
be concerned. The presence and role of sophisticated investors in the market has
lead to this lesser need for mandatory disclosures and to less concern that an
unsophisticated investor will receive an inadequate price, even if issuers do not
make the appropriate disclosures. 145 These sophisticated investors, for their own
selfish interests, make determinations about the value of securities and buy or sell
based on these determinations. Because sophisticated investors account for a
significant amount of the volume of trades, the equilibrium between sophisticated
buyers and sellers often sets the market price. 46 When individuals invest in the
retail market, they receive the benefit of these informed pricing decisions. Recent
research into market inefficiencies and irrationality inform this discussion but do
not refute its central point. 47 Courts have broadly acknowledged the functioning

142. See, e.g., Neuborne. supra note 31, at 25 (stating that the Court's commercial speech cases
demonstrate that hearers of speech "have an instrumental first amendment interest in receiving
information").
143. See Seligman, supra note 41. at 9 (citing five justifications for the mandatory disclosure
system: prohibiting issuers from concealing or misrepresenting information, avoiding excessive
underwriting costs and insider salaries, improving public confidence in capital markets, compensating
for the inability of states or self-regulatory organizations to accomplish these objectives, and combating
the ineffectiveness of civil or criminal remedies alone to provide adequate protection to investors).
144. See supra Part ll.B.
145. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reineer H. Kraakman, The Mvechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 635 42 (1984).
146. See, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE. THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH

OF A PURPOSE 84 n.2 (1979) (arguing that studies showing mutual funds do not outperform market
averages are of little worth, because they "use services of the same kind of financial analyst as do other
institutions. Institutions are so large a portion of the market that, as a group, they can hardly outperform
the market.").
147. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
Market PricingandSecurities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613. 641-93 (1988): see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities
Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 152 88 (2002) (arguing that market inefficiencies call for a
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of this market-pricing mechanism, and the efficient capital markets hypothesis
(ECMH) provides it additional theoretical support.
1. Market Pricingin the Courts
While the Supreme Court has not addressed whether SEC disclosures constitute
commercial speech, it has assessed the validity of the market pricing mechanism.
The decision by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson'48 provides the most
prominent example of this discussion. In that case, the Court accepted the fraud on
the market theory as the basis for allowing a rebuttable presumption of reliance in
private rights of action brought under Rule 1Ob-5 of the '34 Act. 1 49 By accepting
this theory, the Court inherently affirmed the contention that unsuspecting
investors
150
receive the benefit of decisions made by informed investors.
The plaintiff class in Basic contended that the company made material
misrepresentations by falsely denying the existence of merger negotiations, causing
them to sell stock at an artificially low price.'15 The specific issue in Basic was
whether each individual plaintiff had to prove the element of reliance, or whether
reliance could be presumed for the entire class. 152 If the Court required individual
proof of reliance, each plaintiff would have to show that he was aware of the
53
company's false statements and that those statements caused him to take action.
In relying on the fraud on the market theory,
the Court held that reliance could be
1 54
presumed for class certification purposes.
Allowing this presumption meant the Court had to find that the decisions of
informed, sophisticated investors impact the price at which individual, uninformed
investors trade.1 5 The Court noted, "The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the
investor, informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of
the stock is worth the market price,' 156 and "[i]n an open and developed market, the
dissemination of material misrepresentations or withholding of material information
typically affects the price of the stock, and purchasers generally rely on the price
of the stock as a reflection of its value."' 5 In Basic, this concept is used to show

rethinking of regulatory behavior). Nevertheless. Langevoort does not see these inefficiencies as
sufficient justifications for rethinking what is one of the principal practical accomplishments of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), the fraud on the market doctrine. Langevoort, supra,
at 176.
148. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
149. Id. at 243-47.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 228.
152. Id. at 230.
153. Id. at 242.
154. Id. at 247. Also, Basic upheld the materiality standard set forth in TSC Industries v.
Northway, Inc.. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), and applied it to mergers. Basic. 485 U.S. at 232. For our
purposes, the significant holding of Basic relates to the presumption of reliance. See id. at 242-45.
155. See id. at 244-47.
156. Id. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
157. Id. (quoting Peil v. Speiser. 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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how investors can be hurt, even if they do not receive and act on publicly
disseminated information." 8 In the same manner, the informed decisions of
sophisticated investors protect other investors in a way not available to consumers
of regular commercial goods, where the commercial speech doctrine already
applies.
2. Efficiency in CapitalMarkets
The ECMH 5 9 lends additional support to the claim that investors need less
protection than the general public. The ECMH states that information is reflected
in stock prices. 6 ' This theory describes a process whereby investors process
information so that it will be reflected rapidly and accurately in the price of a
security.161 The well-developed capital markets in the United States are examples
of what scholars consider to be efficient markets in action.162 A rational investor in
such a market will continue to seek out information until the cost of doing so
exceeds the value he would receive from additional information.
The implications of the ECMH for speech regulation are twofold. First, there
is some question of the need to require issuers to provide disclosure at all. 63 If
rational investors will seek out information that produces economic benefit, the
mandatory nature of these disclosures is questionable. Proponents of mandatory
disclosure point to fairness concerns, such as whether all market participants will
have equal access to important information under a voluntary regime, and to market
integrity issues-a market where certain basic information on issuers and offerings
is not required to be available is more susceptible to abuse and fraud.'64 These
arguments provide serious support for retaining the mandatory disclosure regime,
but they do not take away from the fact that the rational, information-seeking
behavior of market participants lessens the urgency for SEC speech protections.
There is another aspect of the ECMH and its outgrowths that make it even less
pressing for the government to regulate securities speech: it provides theoretical

158. See id. at 246-49.
159. There are three forms of the ECMH: the weak form, which claims that past price information
is incorporated into current stock prices; the semi-strong form, which claims that all public information
is incorporated into current stock prices; and the strong form, which claims that all information, even
non-public information, is incorporated into stock prices. Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in
Modern FinancialMarkets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57
Bus. LAW. 681, 693 n.88 (2002). When referring to the ECMH, this Article will concentrate on the
semi-strong form claiming that all publicly available information is rapidly assimilated into stock
prices.
160. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 145, at 568-72.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on
Market Information and the Future of the National Market System, 57 Bus. LAW. 637, 651 (2002)
(arguing that price transparency is a core element of United States equity markets).
163. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel. supra note 8 (discussing the functions of legal rules
mandating disclosure and the implications of alternative methods of controlling market prices).
164. See Pinto, supra note 141, at 83 (suggesting that there is a greater potential for fraud in the
securities market, where participants are highly dependent on the seller for information).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58: 757

support for the market pricing mechanism, allowing even those investors who are
completely ignorant to receive the benefit of the collective insights of market
participants. 6 5 If an investor wants to buy one share of Microsoft stock without
knowing anything about the company, the theory of the mandatory disclosure
regime suggests he would be in grave danger. Many disclosures are necessary in
order to understand Microsoft's business, the particular characteristics of the
security the investor is about to purchase, and the main factors that Microsoft
believes will drive its business into the future. In fact, if the prospective purchaser
were in a bazaar bargaining for a share of stock, all of these matters would be of
critical importance. However, this investor will not need to bargain over price, nor
will he be allowed to bargain in any meaningful way. The price will be set by the
market. Many buyers and sellers congregate, some owning stock and willing to sell,
others eager to buy. The collective data, experience, and insight of the group will
set the market price.' 66 Anyone who wants to buy shares will get the benefit of this
price, even if the purchaser knows nothing about the company itself. He will be
able to free ride on the research, expertise, and insights of the many market
participants when making a purchase.
This benefit is significant and not available with regard to other product
advertising. Often the same item sells for different prices at different locations.
There is no single market clearinghouse to determine if the goods or services
offered are of sufficient interest or quality to generate a substantial demand. All of
these things are present in the national securities markets. This advantage makes the
additional prohibition of speech less necessary in the securities area than in other
advertising.
One recent area of inquiry in the finance field is the validity and legitimacy of
the ECMH and its implications for markets. These studies have found significant
events and market trends that do not conform to the efficient model. 6 There are
two primary explanations that each have some support: there is "noise" in the
market, randomly and unexpectedly creating inefficiency, and there are behavioral
explanations that can predict market behavior better than pure assumptions of
rationality.'6 8 These studies argue against a blind faith in the rationality of markets.
However, they do not refute the central point that there are structural benefits of
securities markets, such as the pricing mechanism and rational investor behavior,
even if they do not always act rationally, that benefit market participants in ways
that are unavailable to those who are consumers in the markets where advertiser

165. Neuborne, supra note 31. at 55 (describing capital markets as "highly sophisticated
information processing machines that rapidly assimilate data to price stock through efforts of market
professionals").
166. See id.
167. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and InstitutionalPreconditionsfor Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781. 838-41 (2001): Coffee, supra note 8. at 687-92; Langevoort, supra
note 147, at 139 52.
168. See Langevoort. supra note 147, at 137.
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speech is protected under the commercial speech doctrine. 69
C. Arguments for Heightened Protection of SEC Disclosures Remain
Unpersuasive
Another question, one that many of the earlier commentators addressed, is
whether securities regulation deserves even more protection than that given to
commercial speech. One argument for extending this fuller protection is that federal
securities law is focused on the content of speech. At the core of many disclosure
requirements is the concept of materiality; issuers must disclose material events, but
disclosure might not be required if the event is immaterial to the company. This
focus on materiality is a type of content regulation.' 0 Content regulation has been
traditionally looked upon skeptically by the Court, having to withstand a higher
level of First Amendment scrutiny. 7'
This call for higher scrutiny of the entire regime is unrealistic and misguided.
First, is unrealistic because the Court has never acknowledged that SEC disclosures
are speech at all. Until the Court is willing to show the interest in making the small
and logical step from mandatory disclosures to commercial speech, it is not likely
to provide higher levels of protection. Second, the call for higher scrutiny is
misguided because commercial speechj urisprudence has grown from a different set
of concerns than the traditionally protected areas of speech, such as political,
religious, or expressive communication.'72 The differences in rationale for
protection make the analysis of SEC disclosure more similar to the commercial
speech cases. The corporate speaker rarely has a speech interest as such in the
disclosures it makes. The public interest in protecting this speech relies solely on
benefits it confers on the hearers of speech. This context aligns with advertising, not
with speaker-centered arenas such as political or artistic expression. In those areas,
the rationale for protection is distinct; for example, there is a significant First
Amendment interest in protecting even false, harmful, or misleading speech.' No
such concerns exist with regard to SEC disclosures.
Commentators have argued for different levels of scrutiny for several particular
types of SEC disclosure, analogizing each type to categories of speech that receive

169. See, e.g.. Stephen M. Bainbridge, MandatoryDisclosure:A BehavioralAnalysis, 68 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2000) ("Although some scholars argued market forces will produce optimal levels
of disclosure in a regime of voluntary disclosure, while others argued that various market failures
necessitate a mandatory disclosure system, all shared certain basic assumptions, of which a strong form
of rational choice theory is the most important for our purposes.").
170. Schauer, supra note 71, at 1778.
171. Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentRegulation andthe FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 196-97 (1983).
172. See Neuborne, supra note 31, at 17; Sullivan, supra note 116, at 127 29.
173. See, e.g., Nat'l Socialist Party v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1977) (per curiam)
(involving the protection of speech inherent in certain types of political demonstrations).
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full First Amendment protection. 174 A common call is for heightened review of
proxy speech. Proxy disclosure presents an appealing example because proxy
disclosures look like political speech. 175 Proxy disclosures may involve elections
of directors, votes at a shareholders meeting on topics of interest to the company,
and, sometimes, competing factions. Commentators have noticed this resemblance
and have argued for greater
protection for this type of speech that is more than just
176
proposing a transaction.
It is true that proxy speech is not directly related to the purchase or sale of a
security but is a type of hybrid speech. Unfortunately, there are significant
deficiencies in the analogy to political elections, and it is not clear how this hybrid
disclosure should be treated. Proxy materials are not the speech of the corporation
itself. They are the speech of various claimants who wish to direct the resources of
the corporate whole. 17 7 When management publishes its proxy statement using
company resources, it is an attempt by one stakeholder in the company to convince
other stakeholders of its position on issues.
The idea that the company itself is not speaking through the proxy materials
also lessens the connection to advertising, the traditional form of commercial
speech. In advertising, the seller is directly addressing prospective purchasers. In
a proxy statement, one stakeholder of the "seller," its management and incumbent
board, addresses other stakeholders. Thus, the seller's relationship to the
prospective purchasers is at least one step removed. The advertising analogy
similarly fails when examining other SEC-mandated speech by parties other than
issuers. Proxy solicitation, investment advisor regulation, beneficial ownership
reporting, and regulation of investment newsletters each raise significant speech
issues. These are also issues that have initially caught the attention of courts; 7
however, the commercial speech doctrine is less suited to resolve them.
While proxy speech and other disclosures relating to market participants other
than issuers raise complex, unresolved speech issues, SEC disclosure regulation of

174. It is not at all clear, however, that categorization of SEC disclosures as political speech would
lead to increased protection. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 159 61 (2003)
(upholding restrictions on corporations' political speech in connection with federal elections): see also
Robert H. Sitkoff. CorporatePoliticalSpeech, PoliticalExtortion, andthe Competitionfor Corporate
Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1103, 1108-09 (2002) (describing discrimination against corporate
political speech).
175. Butler & Ribstein. supra note 36, at 163-64 (arguing that "at least one category of corporate
governance speech-proxy speech-should be characterized as political speech and therefore, subject
to the highest level of First Amendment protection").
176. See Estreicher, supra note 36, at 306 23; Wolfson, supra note 36, at 285.
177. See Boyer. supra note 42, at 481 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475
U.S. 1. 14 n.10 (1986)) (regarding the lack of corporate First Amendment interest in the regulation of
proxy solicitations); Soderquist, supra note 67, at 159 (noting that "proxy contests are not analogous
to political campaigns with respect to the First Amendment. Statements by candidates differ
fundamentally from statements made by competing factions in a corporation. The first involves external
speech. directed from the candidate to the public: the second involves speech that is internal to the
corporation.").
178. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 183 (1985); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 767-70 (1978); SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc.. 851 F.2d 365. 366 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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the issuers themselves poses no such problems. 79 Particularly, the periodic
reporting requirements of the '34 Act and the registration process of the '33 Act are
examples of commercial speech and can be analyzed according to that relatively
well-defined set of rules. Because of the concerns expressed by the Court in its
commercial speech jurisprudence, it is most fruitful to look at these securities
regulations as those that prohibit an issuer from making a certain type of disclosure,
those that require disclosures, and those that condition disclosures on issuers taking
additional action.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SEC RULES UNDER COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

If we persuade the Court to turn its attention to the field of securities regulation,
what is it likely to find? This part discusses the application of the current Court's
commercial speech doctrine to SEC regulation. 8 °Analyzing the commercial speech

179. Another example of non-issuer speech regulated by the SEC involves the regulation of
investment advisers' distribution of newsletters and similar publications. The Court has provided some
protection to these parties. See generally Boyer, supra note 42, at 480 ("Lowe represents the high-water
mark of commercial speech protection in the securities area. Its outcome, however, is a familiar one:
direct solicitations may be regulated in order to protect the public, but the law will protect the
dissemination of general information."); Ribstein, supra note 38, at 127 29 (claiming Belotti, Wall
Street Publishing, Lowe, and Long Island Lighting Co. v.Barbash, 779 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 1985)
"suggest that the application of the First Amendment to corporate speech is very much an open
question")).
180. Treating SEC disclosures as commercial speech could lead the Court to invalidate the entire
mandatory disclosure regime. The two arguments against the regime itself are that, simply applying
CentralHudson, the regime does not directly advance the state interest involved, and the government
interest can be served just as well by a more limited restriction. If the regime is admittedly burdensome.
and there is evidence to suggest that some or all of the required disclosures would be publicized absent
any compulsion whatsoever, is the SEC's entire regulatory scheme a poor fit? Does it fail the third or
fourth prongs of the CentralHudson test?
There are two arguments that ought to prevail over this attack to the entire edifice of federal
securities law. First, Central Hudson does not require a perfect match, only a reasonable one tailored
to the goal. Congress, aware of the wide variety of state law practices in effect prior to the '33 Act,
decided to use the less burdensome disclosure approach. Also, substantial evidence suggests that the
securities laws advance Congress's stated goals. See Black, supra note 167, at 831-38: Coffee. supra
note 8, at 735 36, 751 52. Second, the policy arguments asserting the failure of the regime as a whole
are not settled. Researchers continue to review the need for mandatory disclosure, whether efficiency
effectively protects the unsophisticated and unwary. and the degree to which market participants behave
rationally. For a recent survey, see John Y. Campbell. Asset Pricingat the Millennium, 55 J. FIN. 1515
(2000).
We should not lightly overthrow an entire regulatory structure, and certainly not over debated and
disputed conclusions of research that continue to raise questions and objections. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has indicated that this assessment of the entire mandatory
disclosure system may be the end of the inquiry. In SEC v.Wall Street PublishingInstitute Inc.,
851
F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the court of appeals stated, "In areas of extensive federal
regulation-like securities dealing-we do not believe the Constitution requires the judiciary to weigh
the relative merits of particular regulatory objectives that impinge upon communications occurring
within the umbrella of an overall regulatory scheme." However, this statement was made when Posadas
was still good law, and before the expansion of the commercial speech doctrine, particularly before the
Court decided Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002). See supra Part l.B.
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ideas that (1) false or misleading speech is not protected; (ii) simply mandating
disclosures is often consistent with the First Amendment; (iii) conditions on speech
must be narrowly tailored to fit the regulatory purpose; and (iv) suppression of
truthful information based on paternalistic concern is viewed skeptically, this part
examines SEC regulations of three different sorts: those that flatly prohibit certain
types of speech, those that mandate disclosure, and those that condition disclosure
on other speech or action.
A.

Regulations thatForbidthe ProhibitionofTruthful, NonmisleadingSpeech

If the courts ever were to consider securities regulations to be commercial
speech, SEC rules that prohibit the dissemination of truthful information ought not
withstand any serious scrutiny. The commercial speech cases do not allow a
paternalistic concern for whether hearers can handle truthful information to serve
as the basis for prohibition of this type of speech.' 8' Also, the Supreme Court has
noted that "[d]isclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information,
is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress" in enacting the federal securities
laws. "82
' This combination of authority puts SEC regulations forbidding accurate
speech on very weak footing. Examples of these types of regulations are the rules
relating to the offering of securities, such as the "gunjumping" rules, and the recent
prohibition of certain non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
measures in SEC documents.
The prohibitions surrounding the offer and sale of securities are the clearest
examples of First Amendment violations.' 83 The SEC interprets the '33 Act to
prohibit a broad range of corporate communications during the time period between
the filing of a registration statement and the time it is declared effective by the
SEC.' 84 The Commission imposes this "quiet period" on the premise that
information not contained in the prospectus, regardless of its truthfulness, could

The repudiation of Posadas and the forceful protection of commercial speech in the last decade,
particularly the invalidation of FDA speech prohibitions in Thompson. should cause the Court to
reassess this perspective.
181. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 04 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
plurality). Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.748, 773 (1976). For
further discussion of this principle, see supra Part l.B.
182. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988).
183. See Estreicher, supra note 36, at 289 91 ("By withholding from the public at [an] initial
stage relevant, truthful information about particular offerings, the state imposes costs on investors who
may needlessly expend time and effort investigating offerings that do not meet their needs."); Ribstein,
supra note 38, at 136-37 (asserting, under the contract theory of corporate speech, that "[a]ssuming the
speech regulated by the 1933 Act should be given no more protection than ordinary commercial speech,
some aspects of mandatory prospectus regulation under federal and state law raise serious concerns
under the First Amendment .... [T]he possibility that requiring delivery of prospectuses will prevent
some people from making bad investments is outweighed by the large costs imposed on issuers and on
the market.").
184. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
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"condition the market" and mislead investors.'85 Officers of the company are
cautioned by counsel not to hold press conferences, give interviews, or even alert
the public that an offering is about to occur. Recent SEC rulemaking
lightens this
18 6
burden for some of the largest issuers, but not for most others.
This speech is in fact the closest SEC disclosures come to traditional
advertising-what has been recognized in other contexts as commercial speech-as
it alerts the market to a new product-an offering of securities-that market
participants may want to purchase. However, it remains one of the most pervasive
areas of SEC regulation. 18 7 In fact, a seminal case in the area found an issuer liable
for issuing a press release stating that the issuer owned land in the Florida Gold
Coast (true), claiming it was about to go public (true), and naming (accurately) the
investment banker who would be handling the underwriting.' 88
The recent prohibition on non-GAAP measures is similarly troubling under a
commercial speech analysis. As part of the extensive rulemaking following the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC promulgated a rule that addressed various
types of use of non-GAAP financial information." 9 Part of this rule prohibits

185. The Commission issued a Release noting
the publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts, generally,
made in advance of a proposed financing, although not couched in terms of an
express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing
public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which
raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling
effort.
Statement of Commission Relating to Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date
of a Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 3844,22 Fed. Reg. 8,359, 8,359 (Oct. 24, 1957).
186. Securities Offer Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No.
52,065, Investment Company Act Release No. 26.993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44.722.44,744.44,744 n.201 (Aug.
3, 2005). In this release, the SEC allows a sub-category of issuers it defines as "well-known seasoned
issuers" to distribute "free writing prospectus[es]." Id.
187. Patrick Daugherty. Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation.38 EMORY L.J. 67, 68, 117
(1989) ("In anticipation of registration, issuers understand that they generally may continue to advertise
products and services, fulfill periodic reporting requirements, announce factual business and financial
developments, and answer unsolicited inquiries with relevant factual information. Beyond that, the
question [of what is proper to disclose] devolves into one of facts and circumstances, where the
touchstone for analysis is the purpose for disclosure") (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
188. In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, 1959 WE 59531, at
*2, 8 (Feb. 9, 1959).
189. See Conditions for Use ofNon-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8176,
Exchange Act Release No. 47.226. 68 Fed. Reg. 4.820, 4.820 (Jan 30, 2003). Although the regulation
is relatively recent, the SEC's interest in limiting the use of these measures is longstanding. The first
statement of this kind dates back to 1973. Reporting Cash Flow and Other Related Data, Securities Act
Release No. 5377, Exchange Act Release No. 10.041, 38 Fed. Reg. 9.158. 9.158 (Apr. 11. 1973). In
December 2001, the SEC issued a release "sound[ing] a warning to public companies and other
registrants who present to the public their earnings and results of operations on the basis of
methodologies other than Generally Accepted Accounting Principles." Cautionary Advice Regarding
the Use of "Pro Forma" Financial Information in Earnings Releases. Securities Act Release No. 8039,
Exchange Act Release No. 45.124. 66 Fed. Reg. 63.731. 63.732 (Dec. 10, 2001). Without mentioning
whether the information being provided by registrants was truthful, the Commission expressed concern
that "'pro forma' financial information ... can mislead investors," and "its use can make it hard for
investors to compare an issuer's financial information with other reporting periods and with other
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certain types of information from use in SEC filings. For example, companies are
not allowed to exclude charges or liabilities that require cash settlement from nonGAAP liquidity measures. 9 ° Companies also cannot eliminate charges as nonrecurring, infrequent, or unusual if those charges have occurred within the last two
years or are reasonably likely to reoccur within the next two years.191 The
prohibition is not limited to situations where the use of these figures will be
misleading. It applies regardless of the value or truthfulness of the information.
The first reason that these two regulations should be struck down is the line of
precedent disapproving of the suppression of truthful speech.192 As in those cases,
the Court is unlikely to approve of the reasoning that investors should not be
provided with accurate information because a government regulator is concerned
that they will not be able to process it adequately. In addition, under Central
Hudson, the SEC will be unable to demonstrate that it could not achieve its goals
by less intrusive means.193 The primary concern in both the securities advertising
and non-GAAP situations is that the mere existence of this type of truthful
information, along with other required disclosure, has the potential to mislead
investors. However, as seen in the non-GAAP regulations themselves, the SEC has
other means available to ensure that truthful information does not mislead.'94 For
example, requiring additional disclosure or explanatory statements could lessen the
possibility of misleading investors. Enforcement of violations could also reduce the
impact. These combined methods provide powerful protections in other areas, and
no reason exists to think they would not be effective here.
One powerful argument in favor of the SEC's ability to regulate in this manner
is that the SEC is best suited to assess the facts and should be granted deference in
determining how to best keep false and misleading information out of the hands of
investors. 9 5 Courts are typically, and properly, hesitant to interfere with or overturn
thejudgment of regulatory agencies with subject matter expertise and experience.' 96

companies." Id.
190. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10(h)(ii)(A), 229.10(e)(ii)(A) (2006).
191. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10(h)(ii)(B), 229.10(e)(ii)(B) (2006).
192. See supra Part l.B. for a discussion of this line of cases.
193. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557. 566 (1980).
194. See, e.g., Carl M. Loeb, Rhodes & Co., supra note 188, at *6. (containing provisions
requiring additional disclosures when non-GAAP measures are used in different circumstances).
Additional disclosure. providing comparable GAAP measures and a quantitative reconciliation between
the GAAP and non-GAAP measures, is a less burdensome alternative than prohibition of this data
altogether.
195. See Dooley, supra note 38, at 342-43 ("The initial part of the government's case is very easy
to argue. The government has an undeniable interest in the nation's capital markets, and the disclosure
provisions are designed to enhance the efficiency of such markets by reducing investors' information
costs.... But the government need not overstate its case in order to justify the disclosure system. It is
enough if the government can frame a plausible argument that mandatory disclosure produces some
important information that would not be consistently disclosed on a voluntary basis.").
196. Boyer, supra note 42. at 485 ("Because requiring disclosure is less restrictive than banning
speech, O'Brien and Zauderer, when read together, suggest that a communicative act can be
regulated and in the case of securities disclosure, required-on the basis of the non-communicative
conduct that it entails."): Dooley, supra note 38. at 336 ("[G]iven the serious separation of powers
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Making these difficult balancingjudgments is often better left to policymakers than
to courts.' 9 7 The Supreme Court has even noted that a governmental entity may

place appropriate restrictions on speech that is only potentially misleading.' 98
However, in this instance, two important factors temper the presumption in
favor of the SEC. First, the Court has upheld challenges to other speech
prohibitions where the agency's authority stemmed from the bald assertion of its
necessity for preventing public confusion or misunderstanding.' 99 The ability to
prohibit potentially misleading speech is limited to those restrictions that are
reasonably necessary to prevent deception.20 0 Second, in assessing reasonableness,
the SEC does not exactly have the best record in determining when to prohibit
truthful speech. 201 The key example of this is the SEC changing its position
regarding the use of projections.
For decades, the SEC prohibited the use of projections in disclosure
documents.202 It determined that this "soft" information was easily manipulated and
would be confusing for investors. 20 3 Thus, investors should only be given the
factual, historical information on which to base their investing decisions. Then,
with the acceptance of the discounted cash flow model in finance theory and related
developments, 204 investors came more and more to value forward looking
information. Because the value of a security to investors depended on future
production of revenue and income, historical information was only of value to the
extent it could predict future performance. The ban on discussing prospects
hindered investors from receiving the very information they deemed most valuable.
The SEC's response to investors' changing values might be an example of a
flexible regulatory regime changing with the times, but a detailed look at the history
is less charitable to the institution. 25" An article appeared as early as 1961

issues inherent injudicial review of economic regulation, it may be safe bet to that the Court eventually
will hold that corporate disclosure is not commercial speech ....
").
197. Pinto. supra note 141, at 98-99 (citing Bangor & Aroostook R.R. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 574 F.2d 1096, 1107 (1978)).
198. In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
199. ld.at 203 04.
200. See Susan Dente Ross, ReconstructingFirst Amendmnent Doctrine: The 1990s [R]Evolution
of the Central Hudson and O'Brien Tests, 23 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 723. 748 (2001) (quoting
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996)) (claiming that recent rulings on
commercial speech demonstrate that the Court does not defer to legislative findings when reviewing
restrictions on truthful commercial messages but rather looks to fit and effectiveness).
201. One scholar notes,
[T]he [SEC] has used a radical prophylactic approach to speech banning all
speech that might be harmful to someone, some day. The classic SEC approach
applies an interlocking set of prior restraints and restrictions on the form and
timing of speech to minimize the possibility of harmful speech. despite its
concededly restrictive effect on much speech that would be of use to hearers.
Neuborne, supra note 31, at 51.
202. Kitch, supra note 65. at 777.
203. For a detailed discussion of how the SEC practice of prohibiting projections frustrated its
own goal of accuracy enhancement, see id.
at 777 88.
204. See id.at 831 32.
205. See id. at 777.
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questioning the prohibition,2 °6 and the SEC itself raised the question in 1969.207 The
SEC first held hearings on the matter in 1972,208 issued a release announcing its
conclusions in 1973,209 and proposed relevant regulations in 1975.210 These
regulations were burdensome on companies wishing to voluntarily disclose
projections and were never adopted. 21 1The SEC re-assessed its rules and ultimately
adopted a limited safe harbor for projections in 1979, ten years after the matter was
first formally studied.212
This history with projections shows a reluctant regulator who only grudgingly
allowed speech that should have been encouraged decades earlier. In fact, it appears
that we may be on the verge of a similar shift regarding advertising of securities
offerings. This shift began in 1998 with the proposal of a '33 Act reform,
commonly known as the "aircraft carrier release," seeking enormous changes.213
One aspect of these proposals was to lessen some of the restrictions on the ability
of issuers to communicate before and during the offering of securities. 21 4 Although
never adopted, in June of 2005 the SEC did adopt similar rules, at least with regard
to the speech restrictions surrounding offerings. 21 This reform provides some
issuers partial relief from the most burdensome of restrictions, but it still imposes
some or all of its prohibitions on at least some category of issuers.216 It is an
incremental step that does not diminish the constitutional case against these
prohibitions of truthful speech. If anything, it provides additional evidence that,
given enough time and experience, even the most firmly held belief by the

206. See Harry Heller, DisclosureRequirements Under FederalSecurities Regulation, 16 Bus.
LAW. 300, 307 (1961).
207. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS, THE WHEAT REPORT 16 (1969).

208. See Public Hearings on Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Economic Performance.
Exchange Act Release No. 9844, [1972 1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,075, at
82,323 (Nov. 1, 1972).
209. See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No.
5362, Exchange Act Release No. 9984. 38 Fed. Reg. 7220, 7221 (Mar. 19, 1973).
210. Notice of Proposed Rule 132 and Proposed Amendments to Rule 405 and to Form S- 1, S-7,
S-8, S-9 and S-14 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Notice of Proposed Rule 3b-6 and Proposed
Amendments to Rules 12b-2, 13a-11. 14a-9 and 15d-11; to Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 Relating to Annual
Reports to Security Holders; and to Forms 8-K and 10-K, Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to Implement the "Statement by the Commission on the Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance" and to Provide for a More Timely Filing of the Change of Control Item of Form 8-K,
Securities Act Release No. 5581, Exchange Act Release No. 11374. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80.167, at 85.300 (Apr. 28, 1975).
211. See Kitch, supra note 65, at 780 85.
212. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b 6 (2006); see Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act
Release No. 532 No. 6084. Exchange Act Release No. 15.944, Public Utility Holding Company Act
Release No. 21,115, Trust Indenture Act Release (July 2. 1979).
213. Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act ReleaseNo. 7606A, Exchange Act Release
No. 40,632A, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,519A, [1998 TransferBinder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86.108, at 81.461-3 (Nov. 13. 1998).
214. Id. at 81.469.
215. The rules were adopted in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240,
243, 249 and 274. See Securities Offer Reform, supra note 186, at 44,722.
216. See Securities Offer Reform, supra note 186, at 44,722.
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SEC-that truthful speech is harmful or misleading
B.

will be proven incorrect.

UpholdingRegulations Simply Requiring Disclosure

The second type of SEC regulation, that which requires disclosure of certain
types of information, is the most common type of SEC regulation. This type of
regulation is not problematic from a commercial speech perspective. 217 The Court
has acknowledged that it is appropriate for regulators to require the provision of
certain types of information that it deems to be important.2" 8 In Zauderer v. Office
of DisciplinaryCounsel,2 19 the Court noted that a person's
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal. Thus, in
virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have
emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much
more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat
prohibitions on speech, "warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be
appropriately required ... in order to dissipate the possibility of
consumer confusion or deception. 220
While the Zauderer Court addressed a narrower set of requirements, the holding is
consistent with the theory of full and broad dissemination of information that
underpins the Court's commercial speech decisions.
SEC disclosure presents an additional layer of concern that is not present in
general commercial advertising. SEC disclosures are not only required, but the
securities laws subject the issuer-speaker to liability, in some cases strict liability,
for false or misleading statements made in those mandatory disclosures. 22' The
imposition of liability in this circumstance can, and evidence suggests that it often
does, limit the willingness of an issuer to discuss matters of importance. The
potential chilling effect of this liability ought to be taken into account.222
Even with this additional concern, courts should uphold regulations simply
mandating disclosure. The commercial speech jurisprudence does not protect false
and misleading speech.223 If there is some possibility that the regulation of
unprotected speech will impact protected speech, that regulation should be assessed

217. Neuborne, supranote 31. at 41 (claiming that there is no serious First Amendment objection
to mandatory disclosure if that disclosure preserves the hearer's capacity for informed choice).
218. Estreicher, supra note 36. at 286-87 ("When the SEC compels issuers to comply with
disclosure requirements. it is, in a sense, insisting on the provision of the equivalent to up-to-date
product information [of product labels]. The SEC is attempting to prevent fraud and to ensure full and
accurate disclosure concerning the real-world enterprise a securities offering represents.").
219. 471 U.S. 626 (1981).
220. Id. at 651 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)) (emphasis omitted).
22 1. See supra notes 44 60 and accompanying text.
222. For a more detailed discussion of this assertion, see Kitch, supra note 65, at 770 72.
223. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557. 566 (1980).
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under Central Hudson. In the case of securities regulations, the remedy of
punishing false or misleading disclosure seems directly related to the goal of
providing complete and accurate information to potential investors, and the fit is a
good one. There are more draconian methods available to, and used by, the SEC to
avoid false or misleading statements, such as prior restraint of publication. The
sanction directly relates to the interest sought to be protected. Based on these
factors, SEC rules requiring disclosures should be upheld under a CentralHudson
analysis, even though they may have a chilling effect on some protected speech.
C. Seriously Review Regulations that Condition Speech
Other regulations involve more than simple disclosure requirements and place
limitations on speech until or unless certain conditions are met. This type of
regulation is the most difficult to assess and the least susceptible to an easy First
Amendment analysis. An example of this type of regulation is the recently
promulgated Regulation FD .1 4 FD stands for Fair Disclosure, and the regulation is
the SEC's attempt to prohibit the selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information. In essence, it prohibits an issuer from disclosing this information
privately, so that an issuer wishing to make such a disclosure must make the
information publicly available.225
The regulation does not expressly prohibit an issuer from making any truthful
statements. Its terms only require that a private statement be simultaneously
announced to the public by means of a broad dissemination. 226 However, this
regulation has had limiting effects on speech in at least two demonstrable ways.
First, an issuer is not always ready or willing to discuss matters publicly, even if the
issuer is will ing to discuss them privately. This hesitation leads to a reduction in the
overall flow of information from a company in order to time disclosures to public
needs. Second, when private discussions are held, issuers, wary of SEC
enforcement, have set up ground rules that prohibit them from discussing matters
that are likely allowed under the rules but lie in an area of uncertainty. 227 These
meetings with analysts and other market professionals are less candid and
productive and reduce the amount and quality of truthful information in the market.
Under Central Hudson, this type of regulation is only permissible if the

224. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2006).
225. Id. § 243.100(a).
226. Id.
227. The following are examples of facts from SEC enforcement actions under Regulation FD:
In re Schering-Plough Corp. & Richard J. Kogan. Exchange Act Release No. 46.461 (Sept. 9, 2003),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48461;In re Raytheon Co. & Franklyn A. Caine.
Exchange
Act Release No.
46,897 (Nov.
25,
2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46897.htm; In re Siebel Systems, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 46.896 (Nov. 25. 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46896.htm; In re
Secure Computing Corp. & John McNulty, Exchange Act Release No. 46.895 (Nov. 25, 2002).
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46895; Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Settled
Regulation FD Charges Against Flowserve Corp., Its Chief Executive Officer, & Director of Investor
Relations (Mar. 24, 2005), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-41 .htm.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss4/7

30

Drury: Disclosure is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment Constra

2007]

CONSTRAINTS ON SEC REGULATORY AUTHORITY

regulation is narrowly tailored to meet the stated goals. 228 Regulation FD has two
purposes: to ensure the integrity of markets by preventing selective disclosure, and
to more rapidly disseminate information to the public. 229 Regulation FD, almost by
definition, advances the goal of preventing selective disclosure. The difficult aspect
of the analysis concerns the ability of the SEC to accomplish its goal by less
restrictive means. When promulgating new regulations, the SEC is required to
undertake and describe a lengthy cost-benefit analysis. 230 This analysis for
Regulation FD, as well as for other regulations, 231 does not take into account the
speech-based concerns that are the focus of this Article. In fact, no published study
has quantified the impact of Regulation FD on the volume or quality of issuer
speech.
The invalidation of a rule or statute should only be done with ample care, and
any party seeking the invalidation of Regulation FD on First Amendment grounds
should be required to provide some empirical support for that position.232
Nevertheless, there are significant theoretical concerns with the SEC's approach.
First, there is some evidence that privately communicated information does make
its way rapidly into the market.233 In fact, a review of the enforcement actions in
this area shows that the prompt or immediate dissemination234 of the private
communication is the trigger for opening the SEC investigation.
This fact leaves the impression that the true concern Regulation FD addresses
is not that the information will not make it to the market promptly, but that some
will have it before others and use it to their advantage. In other words, it is a matter
of market integrity, not efficiency. However, the market integrity rationale is
severely limited by the fact that insider trading law, an existing enforcement
mechanism, could be used to police infractions. If a party with knowledge passes

228. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
229. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 788 1, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Act Release No. 24.599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716-17 (Aug. 24,
2000).
230. Seeid. at51,731 33.
23 1. See, e.g., Cost-Benefit Discussions in Conditions for Use ofNon-GAAP Financial Measures,
Securities Act Release No. 8176. Exchange Act Release No. 47,226, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,816, at 86,843 (Jan. 22, 2003): Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout
Periods, Exchange Act Release No. 47,225, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,909, [2002 2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 86,817, at 86,872 (Jan. 22, 2003); Strengthening the
Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence. Securities Act Release No. 8183,
Exchange Act Release No. 47.265, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,915 [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,822, at 87,046 (Jan. 28, 2003); Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No.
47,276, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,919, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CHH) 86.823, at 87.100 (Jan. 29, 2003).
232. Interestingly, one party has brought an action against the SEC to invalidate Regulation FD
on First Amendment grounds, among others. The First Amendment objection is based on a claim of
content regulation. not a violation of commercial speech protections. See Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc..
384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 CV 05130), 2004 WL 3142264.
233. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 145, at 630 3 1.
234. See supra note 226.
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it on to another, and that party trades on the material, nonpublic information, both
the tipper and tippee may be prosecuted under federal laws on the books at the time
Regulation FD was passed.235 There is no evidence that this mechanism of
enforcement has proven ineffective or that the SEC seriously considered it as an
alternative in promulgating Regulation FD. If a litigant can provide courts with the
empirical evidence that Regulation FD stifles a substantial amount of truthful
speech by issuers, the courts should give serious consideration to whether it should
strike down the regulation as an unlawful prohibition of commercial speech under
the First Amendment.236
V.

CONCLUSION

Since it first provided protection to commercial speech in 1976, the Supreme
Court has announced a test for scrutinizing regulations that impinge upon speech,
provided a rationale for protecting the interests of the distribution of truthful
information, and not concerned itself with whether other regulatory agencies have
interests in the field. It has also recently indicated an interest in exploring the
expansion of commercial speech protections beyond simple product advertising.
Despite all of these developments, no commercial speech challenge to federal
securities regulation has been successful, or even seriously attempted, in recent
years. Because of the similarity of securities disclosure to advertising, the additional
protection the market brings to investors, and the willingness of the Court to
address even heavily regulated industries, securities regulation should be an
attractive field for the application of the commercial speech doctrine. If federal
securities regulation is considered to be commercial speech, courts will strike down
the regulations' prohibitions on the dissemination of truthful information, will
heavily scrutinize the more burdensome regulations, and the bulk ofthe regulations
will remain in place, providing ample protection for investors.

235. For a discussion of tipper and tippee liability, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-67
(1983).
236. For a thorough discussion of the First Amendment limitations on Regulation FD, see
Anthony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure
Unconstitutional?.39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1(2005).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss4/7

32

